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RUSSIA AND ITS ‘NEW SECURITY ARCHITECTURE’ 
IN EUROPE: 
A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF THE CONCEPT 
CEPS WORKING DOCUMENT NO. 310/JANUARY 2009 
ANDREY S. MAKARYCHEV
* 
Russia’s critique of the existing security architecture and the search for a 
new one 
One of the most important effects of Russia’s war against Georgia in August 2008 was a new 
set of approaches to the future of European security being actively promoted by Dmitry 
Medvedev and Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. According to their interpretation, the Georgian 
war was not a particular incident (an exception) but a structural event, a landmark comparable to 
Russia’s own ‘September 11’ to be symbolised as a ‘moment of truth’.  
Lavrov called the events of August 2008 a systemic breakdown, which necessitates the 
reparation of the deficient architecture of security.
1 What is interesting is that this claim is 
substantiated by two different sets of arguments.  
One of them contains conceptual explanations as to why the existing security institutions are 
weak and inefficient. Firstly, the current security architecture proved unable to prevent a 
number of violent crises, from the Balkans to the Caucasus. Secondly, what is wrong, in 
Russia’s view, is that the European security landscape rests upon obsolete ‘bloc approaches’. 
Thirdly, the prevailing approaches to security are excessively ideologised. Though neither of the 
prominent Russian speakers explains the exact meaning of this invective, one may guess that it 
may boil down to Russia’s criticism of the conflation of normative/democracy-related and 
security arguments. Thus, Russia insists that security decisions (including NATO enlargement) 
should not be based upon the assessments of the state of democracy in one country or another. 
Fourthly, in today’s Europe, to the dissatisfaction of Russia, certain countries and their groups 
enjoy special (exclusive) rights in security-making – a clear allusion to NATO. Fifthly, Lavrov 
compared today’s security arrangements to a patchwork,
2 a metaphor pointing to fragmentation 
and lack of due uniformity. 
Perhaps the most noticeable logical problem looming large at this juncture is that the Kremlin 
tends to find the roots of the current imperfections in international security in both ‘bloc 
approaches’ and unipolarity.
3 In the meantime, these are different concepts and could hardly be 
equated with one another in a single frame of analysis. To some extent, what Medvedev and 
Lavrov dub the ‘bloc approach’ – which necessitates at least two competing groups of allied 
                                                      
* Head of Academic Department, Civil Service Academy, Nizhny Novgorod. 
1 Sergey Lavrov, “Rol’ sotrudnichestva RF-ES i biznes-soobschestv storon v usloviakh finansovo-
ekonomicheskogo krizisa” (“The role of cooperation between the RF-ES and business communities of the 
parties concerned in the situation of financial and economic crisis” – our translation), 10 December 2008 
(http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/0/F54FF6DCD2C14E6DC325751B00501E13). 
2 Sergey Lavrov, interview with Helsinki Sanomat, 9 November 2008 (http://www.mid.ru). 
3 Dmitry Medvedev’s speech at the World Policy Conference, Evian, 8 October 2008 
(http://www.kremlin.ru/text/appears/2008/10/207422.shtml). 2 | ANDREY S. MAKARYCHEV 
 
states – contradicts the model of a unipolar – i.e. America-dominated – world (which, in one of 
Lavrov’s most recent revelations, no longer exists and makes the entire enterprise of subverting 
it futile). 
In a second – less conceptual and more pragmatic – type of argument advanced by Medvedev, 
these conceptual interrogations are devoid of any importance. “Today Russia is not part of any 
politico-military alliance… Yet we are interested in our voice being heard in Europe… We 
would like to have a platform where we could discuss a variety of issues”.
4 In other words, 
Russia simply needs an institutional playground for making its standpoint known 
internationally, since, according to the logic behind this reasoning, all decisions taken without 
consulting Russia are implicitly anti-Russian.  
Therefore, a ‘new security architecture’, as opposed to an ‘old’ one, has to, logically speaking: 
a) be able to prevent violent conflicts; b) be of a ‘non-bloc’ nature; c) avoid ideological 
connotations; d) exclude the possibility of exceptional security status for the strongest nations; 
e) contain ‘suturing’ mechanisms allowing for more coherence between all countries; and f) put 
Russia on an equal footing with other participants. It might seem that Russia is gradually 
moving towards a more or less ‘rigid’ definition of security, yet there are two key problems with 
the implementation of this ‘grand project’. Firstly, Russia lacks a clear vision of its own role in 
it. The attempts to symbolise the war against Georgia as constitutive of a new Russian security 
posture seem to be full of contradictions, since they only complicate the answer to the question 
of what Russia is aiming for in international politics. Instead of providing a background for a 
new, more coherent understanding of Russian security identity, the war blurred the 
identification lines and raised a host of new questions. Post-war self-assertive Russia under 
closer scrutiny appears to be at a crossroads and is torn apart by multiple controversies, mostly 
conceptual ones.  
Secondly, Russia is not certain of the kind of international order in which the concept of 
‘security architecture’ may be inscribed. What is more or less clear is that Russia is trying to 
prioritise its relations with the European Union countries in tackling security issues. Yet the 
process of communication between two subjects presupposes what Slavoj Zizek called “the 
third agency to which we both submit ourselves”.
5 This alleged “third agency” is dubbed by the 
Slovenian philosopher as an “impersonal symbolic Order”, or “the multitude of empirical 
others” associated by rules, institutions and regulations. To translate this theoretical statement 
into political language, the interrelationship between two neighbours is always conditioned by 
‘the third’ to which each of them relates/refers in one way or another.
6 Within the context of the 
analysis of EU-Russia security dialogue, the idea of the ‘third agency’ can be introduced 
through the concept of the International Society (IS) which will be understood in this paper in 
the traditions of the English school. “A society of states (or international society) exists when a 
group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, forms a society in 
the sense that they conceive of themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their 
relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions”.
7 In other words, 
cont(r)acting with each other in the security domain, both parties have to refer and appeal – in 
one way or another – to a wider set of international norms. However, Russia and the EU usually 
                                                      
4 Dmitry Medvedev’s meeting with the members of the Council on Foreign Relations, Washington, D.C., 
16 November 2008 (http://www.kremlin.ru/text/appears/2008/11/209249.shtml). 
5 Slavoj Zizek, “Neighbors and Other Monsters: A Plea for Ethical Violence”, in The Neighbor: Three 
Inquiries in Political Theology, Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2005, p. 139. 
6 Ibid., p. 144. 
7 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2002, p. 13. RUSSIA AND ITS ‘NEW SECURITY ARCHITECTURE’ IN EUROPE | 3 
 
either have different versions of the IS in their minds, or they tend to confuse – intentionally or 
unintentionally – the IS with other concepts, such as the international order, the international 
system, etc.  
Another reference to Zizek could also be instrumental at this juncture: in his mind, it is 
insufficient to assume that there are pre-existing, established political subjects capable of 
exploiting the norms. “It is not only that the subject has to adopt a stance towards the norms that 
regulate his activity – these norms in their turn determine who and what is or is not recognized 
as subject”.
8 This argument is of importance for further analysis since it raises a question of 
what kind of Russia as an international subject emerges from the debates on a new security 
architecture in Europe? More specifically, we need to know not only what kind of security 
Russia supports, but also how the security discourse changes Russia’s identity and international 
subjectivity.  
My general approach to these questions starts with an understanding of Russian identity as 
‘ontologically dislocated’, or unstable, divided, split and unfixed. This is basically due to two 
main factors. Firstly, Russian identity (as, in fact, any identity) is heavily dependent “upon an 
outside which both denies that identity and provides its conditions of possibility at the same 
time”,
9 as Ernesto Laclau rightly claims. This dependency can be discerned in the very fact that 
the ‘new security architecture’ discourse emerges as a series of speech acts that address mostly 
European countries and are grounded in one or another version of international society. 
Secondly, Russia’s hegemonic moves lead to an inconsistent combination of different roles this 
country tries to play. In the interpretation of its past, Russia is both a destroyer of the Soviet 
empire (an argument constitutive for Russia’s role as a co-sponsor of the end of the Cold War) 
and a heritor of the USSR (an argument that partly explains Russia’s resistance to the 
Holodomor
10 and Katyn
11 discourses). In terms of Russia’s present identity, it seems to be a 
mixture of a typically Realpolitik pragmatism (Medvedev argues that Western countries just 
have to accept the “reality” of secession of the two territories from Georgia and avoid hysterical 
reaction to “virtual situations”
12), on the one hand, and a liberal assumption that explains foreign 
policy by domestic developments (in Putin’s interpretation, it is the presidential election in the 
US that predetermined the position America took in this conflict
13), on the other. Russian 
identity includes both institutional commitments (Medvedev has vehemently called for a new 
treaty on European security) and what might be called ‘reluctant unilateralism’ (in Medvedev’s 
assessment, Russia and NATO “may say good-bye to each other”, but it is NATO that has the 
stronger interest in continuing the cooperation). Russian identity mixes up particularist 
assumptions (each act of recognition is particular and singular, Medvedev says
14) and universal 
                                                      
8 Zizek, op. cit., p. 139. 
9 Quoted in Aletta J. Norval, “Theorising Dislocations”, paper presented at the workshop on New 
Stability, Democracy and Nationalism in Contemporary Russia, Basel, 26-27 September 2008, p. 3. 
10 Holodomor refers to the death by starvation of millions of Ukrainians under Soviet rule. In March 
2008, the Ukraine parliament (and governments of many other countries) recognised the actions of the 
Soviet government as an act of genocide. The joint declaration at the United Nations in 2003 defined the 
famine as the result of cruel actions and policies of the totalitarian regime, and on 23 October 2008 the 
European Parliament adopted a resolution that recognised the Holodomor as a crime against humanity. 
11 The Katyn massacre, was a mass murder of thousands Polish military officers, policemen, intellectuals 
and civilian prisoners of war by the Soviet NKVD (secret police) in 1940.  
12 Dmitry Medvedev’s interview with Al Jazeera TV, Sochi, 26 August 2008 
(http://www.kremlin.ru/text/appears/2008/08/205783.shtml). 
13 Vladimir Putin’s interview with CNN, 28 August 2008 (http://www.government.ru). 
14 Dmitry Medvedev’s interview with “Russia today” TV station, Sochi, 26 August 2008 
(http://www.kremlin.ru/text/appears/2008/08/205773.shtml). 4 | ANDREY S. MAKARYCHEV 
 
explanations (by describing actions in South Ossetia and Abkhazia in terms of “we did what 
others have done in Kosovo”,
15 Medvedev in fact accepted the logic of the ‘chain effect’). The 
enumeration of these examples of dislocations could be developed further. 
This paper offers one of the possible theoretical ways of reflecting upon these uneasy matters. In 
one sense, it can be viewed as a reaction to Lavrov’s invitation to the expert community to make 
Russia’s ideas a matter of both academic and policy-oriented analysis. The approach I propose 
in this Working Document rests upon a peculiar combination of the critical theory and the 
English school, a mix that constitutes, in my view, an appropriate theoretical frame to answer 
the question of what conceptual choices Russia faces in articulating its new vision of security in 
Europe, and why the various concepts of international society have to be taken into account for 
policy-makers tackling security issues. 
Four models of international society 
My further analysis will be based upon two presumptions that may be instrumental in 
identifying the four possible types (models) of international society, and, consequently, in 
making the menu of Russian and European options more voluminous.  
First, there is a gap between the ‘thick’ version of international society that is (at least) rule-
based and (at most) value-driven, and the ‘thin’ one that is formed when two or more states may 
exert some impact on one another
16 on the basis of “great power management and its consequent 
derivate institution, balance of power”,
17 yet without any meaningful normative commitments. 
This dichotomy roughly corresponds to the distinction between what might be alternatively 
dubbed ‘normative’ and ‘decisionist’ types of IS. 
Where do Russia and the EU stand in this polemic? The European Union seems to give priority 
to the ‘thick’ version of IS, with a clear emphasis on normativism understood as “a way of 
thinking that emphasizes the central importance of an autonomous legal order for constraining 
the arbitrary and personal exercise of political power”.
18 The Russian stance is a bit more 
ambiguous: it appears to be more “systemic rather than normative”.
19 As a German scholar 
rightly notes, Russian international discourse is torn between a “sovereignist”, “exceptionalist” 
or “nationalist” reading of Russia as being surrounded by a fundamentally hostile environment 
with no reliable friends, on the one hand, and “internationalist reading” according to which 
Russia stays in line with the international community in managing the most deadly security 
challenges, on the other. Putin’s 
demand for more security and control relies on two different points that cannot be 
reconciled easily… He makes his claim on the ground of the long-lasting conflict 
                                                      
15 Dmitry Medvedev’s interview with BBC, Sochi, 26 August 2008 
(http://www.kremlin.ru/text/appears/2008/08/205775.shtml). 
16 Hedley Bull, op. cit., p. 9. 
17 Pami Aalto, “Russia’s Quest for International Society and the Prospects for Regional-Level 
International Societies”, International Relations, Vol. 21, No. 4, 2007, p. 463.  
18 Jef Huysmans, “International Politics of Exception”, paper prepared for presentation at the SGIR Fifth 
Pan-European Conference, The Hague, the Netherlands, 9-22 September 2004, p. 7. 
19 Jef Huysmans, “International Politics of Insecurity: Normativity, Inwardness and the Exception”, 
Security Dialogue, Vol. 37, No. 1, 2006, p. 14. RUSSIA AND ITS ‘NEW SECURITY ARCHITECTURE’ IN EUROPE | 5 
 
between Russia and the West and, at the same time, the solidarity between Russia and 
the West…The question is: can a discourse be built on such a shaky ground?.
20 
The most recent developments, including the August 2008 war against Georgia, apparently 
moved Russia further away from the European understanding of IS to what might be 
presumably dubbed the formation of a “political subject which is absolutely free”
21 from 
international commitments and thus insensitive to external pressures, including normative ones. 
One of the key messages conveyed by the Kremlin in autumn 2008 was meant to question the 
primordial importance of cooperating with such institutions as NATO, G8 and WTO. Even the 
speculations about removing the 2014 Olympics from Sochi to a different city were met by 
Putin with an irascible response.  
Second, two other patterns of the IS may compete with each other – a unitary (otherwise called 
solidarist) and a pluralist one. The unitary model (supported, by and large, by the EU) is based 
upon more or less homogenous rules of the game for all state actors involved, while the pluralist 
one (with which Russia sympathises) admits the multiplicity of political singularities potentially 
clashing with each other.  
Based upon these two – mostly theoretical – dichotomies, an elementary matrix of four types of 
international society could be charted. These types are conceptually derived from the IR schools 
of thought, and in more practical terms will be used to assess Russia’s relation to each of them.  
 
  Unitary Pluralist 
Decisionist/‘thin’  1: Unipolarity (Pax Americana)  3: Multi-polarity/poly-centricity 
Normative/‘thick’  2: Cosmopolitan/ supranational rule of law  4: Competition of norms 
 
A brief theoretical comeback may be useful at this point. As Ernesto Laclau argues, dislocation 
is the primary level of the construction of the social. To put it differently, each societal model, 
including those of the international society, contains irremovable ruptures and gaps within it. In 
the analysis that follows I will try to uncover some of them. 
Apparently, type 1 is the least desirable for both Russia and the EU, but it is exactly what makes 
this quadrant analytically important. It is in opposition to it that all other alternatives are being 
articulated, sometimes in unexpectedly ethical terms: in the words of Medvedev, unipolarity is 
“immoral”.
22  
Yet under closer scrutiny, despite surprisingly normative language, Russia’s opposition to the 
US-driven unipolarity appears rather inconsistent. For Moscow, Washington is certainly not a 
Schmittian enemy threatening it militarily, but rather an opponent who refuses to admit Russia 
as an equal partner in security building. What is more astonishing is that in certain situations the 
Kremlin does not rule out taking advantage of the US hegemony which, in Russian eyes, makes 
European countries gravitate towards the American geopolitical pole (in Dmitry Rogozin’s 
indicative words, Poland is trying to be holier than the Pope in its imitation of Washington”
23). 
                                                      
20 Johannes Angermuller, “Fixing meanings - Political discourse in the Russian Federation after Beslan”, 
paper presented at the workshop on New Stability, Democracy and Nationalism in Contemporary Russia, 
University of Basel, 26-27 September 2008, p. 3. 
21 Viatcheslav Morozov, “Sovereignty and democracy in contemporary Russia: a modern subject faces the 
post-modern world”, Journal of International Relations and Development, No. 11, 2008, p. 155. 
22 Dmitry Medvedev’s speech at the World Policy Conference. 
23 Quoted in The Moscow News, No. 35, 5-11 September 2008, p. 2. 6 | ANDREY S. MAKARYCHEV 
 
Putin’s reaction to the alleged submission of the EU to American power was even more 
straightforward: “If European countries continue carrying out such policies, we will have to talk 
to Washington about European matters”.
24 Yet, in spite of the imbedded pragmatism, there are 
at least two flaws in this logic. Firstly, Putin’s statement is a good expression of the reluctant – 
and often unrecognised – US-centrism in Russia’s foreign policy. What Putin implicitly had in 
mind is that at some junctures Moscow would prefer bilateral talks with Washington to 
ineffective communication with the EU members. Yet it is exactly this US-centrism that Russia 
otherwise rebuffs as the unacceptable form of unipolarity that leads to multiple imbalances in 
the structure of international relations. Secondly, the above-mentioned argument contains an 
overt reference to a presumed European weakness and an inability to formulate and defend 
authentic security policies of its own. For example, Belgium, a home to both NATO and EU 
institutions, is sometimes portrayed in the Russian media as a “moribund” country, being on the 
brink of disintegration and suffocated by domestic controversies.
25 This type of Europe seems to 
be easy to manipulate: “Europe must decide whether it needs pipeline [Nord Stream] gas from 
Russia in the volumes we are offering or not. If not, we won’t build this pipeline, we will 
instead build factories for liquefying gas and send it to global markets, including Europe”,
26 
Putin said in autumn 2008. The practical problem looming large at this juncture is that this 
discursive – and seemingly intentional - debilitation of European countries runs against Russia’s 
policies of prioritising Moscow-Berlin, Moscow-Rome, and especially Moscow-Paris (as 
exemplified by the Medvedev-Sarkozy plan of post-conflict settlement in the Caucasus) axes.  
Type 2 represents an overlay of unitary/solidarist and normative platforms, a model of the IS 
that seems to be quite desirable for both Russia and the EU. Yet Russia is not inimical to this 
option as well: it is normative credentials that to a significant extent legitimise Russia’s 
eagerness to be part of the international society. Russia tries to convince others that it is 
democracy that Russia seeks in the international arena, even if this type of democracy is reduced 
to the mere plurality of strong states under the guise of ‘multipolarity’. Russia therefore seems 
to be ready to contribute to constructing rules of the game based upon international institutions 
and a more or less unified interpretation of international law. In particular, the Russian 
representative to NATO has called for the establishment of an international tribunal (modelled 
on the one already existing in The Hague) to deal with ethnic cleansings in the North 
Caucasus.
27 
Within this predominantly normative logic, Russia is supposed to keep integrating in the 
existing IS structures, however unfair or imperfect they might be. Russia’s efforts to use 
explicitly normative arguments as constitutive of its foreign policy were evident during the 2007 
conflict with Estonia over the ‘memorial sites’ of the Second World War. By the same token, 
normative judgements were one of Russia’s major arguments against the Saakashvili regime in 
Georgia, Ukraine’s NATO membership and the disenfranchisement of the Russian-speaking 
population in the Baltic countries, etc. In this context, not only the Georgian President was 
lambasted “a heritor of Stalin and Beria”; according to Putin, “those who insist that Abkhazia 
and Southern Ossetia are to belong to Georgia are Stalinists, since they sustain the decision 
taken by Stalin”.
28 Evidently, in this situation Putin addresses mostly the Western audience, 
much more sensitive to normative arguments than the Russian public. 
                                                      
24 Ibid. 
25 Daria Aslamova, “Chemu nauchit nas Evropa?” (“What does Europe have to teach us?”), 
Komsomolskaya Pravda, 4-11 September 2008, pp. 8-9. 
26 The Moscow Times, No. 45, 14-20 November 2008, p. 18. 
27 Kommersant, No. 141, 12 August 2008, p. 2. 
28 Vladimir Putin’s interview with CNN, Sochi, 28 August 2008 (http://www.government.ru). RUSSIA AND ITS ‘NEW SECURITY ARCHITECTURE’ IN EUROPE | 7 
 
Yet acting within the normative/solidarist logic, Russia displays a number of contradictions. At 
least three of them deserve attention in this essay. Firstly, the August five-day-war can be 
paradoxically interpreted as a continuation of Russia’s desperate attempts to position itself as a 
‘normal’ international subject in a scenario lacking global normative consensus. What is more, 
in August 2008 the Kremlin implicitly accepted the US foreign policy philosophy it otherwise 
lambasted, which gave Russia a chance not only to confirm its belonging to a ‘normal’ group of 
countries but – what is of primordial importance – to claim the power to ‘normalise’ (‘discipline 
and punish’, to put in a Foucauldian way) those who are portrayed as ‘virtual’ (i.e. being subject 
to external manipulation) governments allegedly deviating from international standards and 
causing large-scale security problems. 
Secondly, Russia is more a norm-exploiter than a norm-producer. It stays far-removed from 
multiple norm-producing initiatives on a trans-national scale, including – but not limited to – 
norms that regulate transparency, accountability, sustainable development, good governance, 
and so on. If Russia remains aloof in these debates, communicative problems with its major 
Western partners are inevitable.  
Thirdly, another point of contention relates to the way in which security is ‘problematised’ 
within this normative/solidarist framework. As seen from the Kremlin perspective, the idea of 
security comes in a number of versions. Most of them touch upon the conceptual content of 
security and include:  
a)  Common security which aims at forming a comprehensive/inclusive security framework to 
avoid the possibility of excluding or marginalising someone on any grounds. 
b)  Equal security, which – at least, in Medvedev’s words - aims at avoiding exceptional 
(mostly ‘hard security’) arrangements within the ‘Euro-Atlantic security space’. Needless to 
say this interpretation de-legitimises the concepts of Nordic, Baltic or Barents-Euroarctic 
security complexes, to name but a few examples. 
c)  Indivisible security
29 which is formulated as an antithesis to the classic Realpolitik ‘security 
dilemma’ (“we are not supposed to build our security at the expense of others”).
30  
d)  United space of collective security with, presumably, a uniform interpretation of key 
principles of security. 
e)  Single system of comprehensive security to be based upon the principle of ‘polycentrism’ 
and the leading role of the United Nations. 
What is baffling is not only the unnatural number of adjectives that the Russian leaders attach to 
the word ‘security’, as if trying to fill the ‘empty signifier’ with as many meanings as possible, 
but also the simultaneous characterisation of the novel ‘security architecture’ as both ‘space’ 
and ‘system’. The semantic difference between the two is quite meaningful: the ‘spatial’ 
understanding of security contains strong allusions to the possibilities of an inter-subjective 
construction of security identities of all parties involved, while a ‘systemic’ approach is much 
less demanding and more mechanistic, presupposing ‘single’ rules of the security game to be 
obeyed.  
The ‘word games’ certainly don’t stop here. Thus, Lavrov explained Russia’s offensive in 
Georgia as the pursuit of “human security”,
31 which seems to be some way from the prevailing 
                                                      
29 Sergey Lavrov, Presentation at the 16
th session of the SMID OBSE, Helsinki, 5 December 2008 
(http://www.mid.ru). 
30 Dmitry Medvedev’s speech at the World Policy Conference. 8 | ANDREY S. MAKARYCHEV 
 
European understanding of this concept. The least one can say is that Lavrov intentionally 
confused “human security” with “the responsibility to protect”. Yet he simultaneously 
misinterpreted the idea of human security, which was initially conceived as a critical tool to 
shed light on the failures of state-based security and aimed against existing hierarchies of 
power.
32 This is one of many examples of the different meanings the EU and Russia attach to 
the key concepts they utilise. 
By the same token, other ‘word games’ contain clear references to the geographical scope of the 
‘security architecture’-to-be, which raises new – and no less important – definitional problems. 
Thus, the Russian President mentioned the “Pan-European security space”,
33 while on other 
occasions he or his colleagues referred to the “Euro-Atlantic” or even “global” scale of their 
initiative, which is reportedly justified by Lavrov’s call to the “world community” (not just 
“international society”) as the proper audience to discuss Russia’s proposals. The key question 
is whose security we are talking about, and what the boundaries of “this security space” are. By 
now, what is clear is that this space has to be wider than the NATO area.
34 Much less clear is 
whether, for example, South Ossetia and Abkhazia have to be admitted as fully-fledged 
members of this ‘security space’ (should Moscow insist on their inclusion, the entire idea will 
be questioned by the lack of common understanding of who are and who are not legitimate 
participants of this ‘space’). 
Type 3 offers a model of international society grounded in the ability of sovereign powers to 
take political decisions of their own, a perspective rather close to the concept of pluriversum.
35 
This type seems to be more desirable to Russia than to the EU: Medvedev all too easily drops 
the language of multilateralism in favour of unilateral decisionism: “As far as our military 
contingent [in South Ossetia] is concerned, I would like to draw your attention to the fact that 
not a single document, including our joint plan with President Sarkozy, previsions that this 
contingent would abide by any rules… It is up to us to define what troops we need there, where 
they will be based and what kind of military bases will be deployed over there”.
36 
What is more, Russian government sometimes incites other governments to act within the logic 
of sovereign decisions. “We expected that the US administration would intervene in the 
[Georgian – South Ossetian] conflict and stop the aggressive intentions of the Georgian 
leadership”,
37 said Prime Minister Putin; while one of the Kremlin spin-doctors Gleb Pavlovsky 
interpreted the Russian diplomatic standpoint as aimed at making the United States “choose 
between Russia and Georgia”.
38 Medvedev’s multiple suggestions that the Western countries 
need to be pragmatic and guided by their “genuine interests” (presumably comprehended by the 
                                                                                                                                                            
31 Sergei Lavrov’s meeting with the Council on Foreign Relations members, New York, 24 September 
2008 (www.mid.ru). 
32 David Chandler, “Human Security: The Dog That Didn’t Bark”, Security Dialogue, Vol. 39, No. 4, 
2008, p. 434. 
33 Joint press conference of Dmitry Medvedev, Jose Manuel Barroso and Nicolas Sarkozy, Nice, 14 
November 2008 (http://www.kremlin.ru/text/appears/2008/11/209203.shtml). 
34 Sergey Lavrov, Transcript of the presentation and questions and answers regarding the outcomes of the 
SMID OBSE before the Russian media, Helsinki, 5 December 2008 ( http://www.mid.ru). 
35 Alexandr Filippov, “Universalism or pluralism?”, Kosmopolis, No. 3 (9), Autumn 2004, p. 90. 
36 Medvedev’s interview with Le Figaro newspaper, 13 November 2008 
(http://www.kremlin.ru/textx/appears/2008/11/209126.shtml). 
37 Putin’s interview with CNN, Sochi, 28 August 2008 (http://www.government.ru). 
38 Gleb Pavlovskiy, “Vozvraschenie iz Gori”, (“Return from Gori”) Expert, No. 33, 25-31 August 2008, 
p. 60. RUSSIA AND ITS ‘NEW SECURITY ARCHITECTURE’ IN EUROPE | 9 
 
Russian President better), as opposed to “imagined ideological clichés”,
39 also fit, by and large, 
the decisionist, rather than normative, foreign policy philosophy. It may lead, paradoxically, to a 
post-factum acceptance of the way the Kosovo controversy was resolved (for instance, trying to 
justify the participation of the delegations from Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the Geneva 
negotiations, Medvedev claimed that “there are lots of similar precedents when, say, such kind 
of issues were raised with regard to Kosovo, and the [newly recognized] countries from the 
outset were part of the talks. I am sure we should stem from this”
40).  
Yet an even deeper problem surfaces with the pluralist/decisionist quadrant falling apart into 
different concepts of IS. What is known for sure is that the unipolar organisation of international 
society is unacceptable to the Kremlin, but what it stands for remains unclear. A number of 
possible options are the subject of debate:  
a)  Multipolar IS, which presupposes a certain degree of conflictuality between different poles 
that might be inimical to - but will contain - each other. In the Russian worldview, 
multipolarity connotes with democracy deprived of its strong political and normative 
meanings and reduced to the mere multiplicity of sovereign states, regardless of the nature 
of their political regimes. 
b)  Polycentric IS in which the ‘poles of growth’ would be able to pragmatically cooperate with 
each other in fields other than security. This is an ostensibly de-politicised version of the IS, 
where politics ranks much lower than economics, environment, communication and 
technology. There might be no place for politics proper in such a society where the 
distinction between ‘ours’ and ‘not-ours’ fades away, and security concerns are drastically 
downgraded. This interpretation clearly demarcates ‘de-politicised’ polycentrism from a 
much more politically accentuated and security-driven multipolarity of sovereign nations. 
The polycentric type of IS also challenges the primacy of state politics over regional 
“spaces of flows”
41 in an attempt to prevent the return of a more traditional power balancing 
with its inevitable bordering effects and the accentuation of “negative otherness”, fear, 
violence, and hegemonic control.  
c)  Multilateralism as understood in Russia, “in its ideal form, as co-ordinated international 
action around key issue areas, rather than dense horizontal co-operation aimed at developing 
congruent policies”.
42  
d)  A-polar / network-like IS, with no domination or hegemony,
43 and with power dispersed 
among a variety of actors, including non-state ones.
44 This approach connotes with what 
might be dubbed a ‘New Regionalism’ school of thought that challenges fixed, centralist 
and security-geared frameworks of analysis. This post-sovereign/post-structuralist pattern of 
                                                      
39 Medvedev’s interview with BBC, Sochi, 26 August 2008 
(http://www.kremlin.ru/text/appears/2008/08/205775.shtml). 
40 Medvedev’s press conference at the Eurasian Economic Community Inter-state Council meeting, 
Bishkek, 10 October 2008 (http://www.kremlin.ru/text/appears/2008/10/207570.shtml). 
41 Pertti Joenniemi, “Regionality: A Sovereign Principle of International Relations?”, in Heikki Patomaki 
(ed.), Peaceful Changes in World Politics, Tampere Peace Research Institute, Research Report No. 71, 
1995, p. 363. 
42 Elana Wilson Rowe and Stina Torjesen, “Key features of Russian multilateralism”, in Elana Wilson 
Rowe and Stina Torjesen (eds), The Multilateral Dimension in Russian Foreign Policy, London & New 
York: Routledge, 2009, p. 3. 
43 Eduard Batalov, Chelovek, mir, politika, Moscow: Obraforum, 2008, p. 179. 
44 Alexandr Konovalov, “Mir ne dolzhen byt’ mnogopoliarnym” (“The world should not be multi-polar”), 
Nezavisimaya gazeta, 16 September 2008. 10 | ANDREY S. MAKARYCHEV 
 
the IS violates uniformity, supports ambiguity, and encourages rather than penalises the 
crossing of borders and the transcending of hierarchies. It increases the tolerance for 
diversity, variance, decentralisation and fragmentation.
45 In Pertti Joenniemi’s view, the 
network-based “neo-regionalism” produces ambivalence and plurality rather than clarity 
and order. Therefore, the security cooperation is supposed to be inclusive and blur the 
boundaries between the inside and the outside. 
Type 4  may be illustrated by the Kosovo debates when Putin implicitly argued that in a 
situation of open conflict between two constitutive principles of international law – territorial 
integrity and the right of self-determination – Russia supports the first principle and repudiates 
the second as a left-over from Soviet strategy in the times of colonialism.
46 As I have noted 
earlier, in the cases of Abkhazia and South Ossetia Russia reversed its preferences. 
Another example is the collision of two different norms guiding Russia’s energy policies. On 
the one hand, the Kremlin’s demands for market prices to be paid by all customers seems to be 
fully legitimate and rule-based; yet on the other hand, the disconnection of energy supplies to 
transit countries like Ukraine conflicts with the established mechanisms of international 
arbitrage, which regulate commercial disputes between sovereign states, including those 
between suppliers and their clients.  
These examples are important since they allow us to take a look at the concept of dislocation, 
already discussed earlier, from another angle. In Laclau’s reasoning, the more dislocated a 
structure is, the more the field of decisions and the role of the subject expands; and, as a 
consequence, a decentring of the structure is coterminous with the construction of a plurality of 
power centres.
47 In other words, structural dislocations in a form of two competing norms open 
new possibilities for a political type of behaviour based upon sovereign political wills, which 
might either provoke antagonisms or lead to political negotiations. The political implication of 
this argument is clear: the existing international structures do not automatically define which of 
the two competing norms has to be enacted, and the decision to choose one is always political in 
the strict sense – i.e. it has to be based rather upon sovereign will than determined by structural 
circumstances.  
Russia and the four models 
As we may see, Russia feels both at a disadvantage in the existing architecture of the IS and 
aims at becoming an important shaper of it. Against this uncertain background, it seems 
reasonable to explore the extent to which Russian foreign policy may lead to the materialisation 
of three out of four options described above (the first type of international society, namely the 
US-centred, is way beyond what Russia might support).  
Type 2 (a conflation of normative and unitary/solidarist concepts of IS) leaves Russia with a 
perspective of repositioning itself as an autonomous pole in the ‘top league’ of the ‘Euro-
Atlantic’ community of nations, along with United States and the European Union. Ideally, 
Russia might start thinking of itself as a truly global power through investing its resources in 
multilaterally solving the most pressing challenges of climate change, environmental decay, 
transnational crime and corruption networks, terrorism and international piracy,
48 human 
                                                      
45 Pertti Joenniemi, op. cit., pp. 338-373. 
46 Vladimir Putin’s interview with journalists of G8 Countries, 4 June 2007 
(http://www.kremlin.ru/texts/appears/2007/06/132365.shtml). 
47 Aletta Norval, op. cit., p. 3. 
48 The first Russian-British experience of fighting Somali pirates in November 2008 looks quite 
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trafficking, energy security, etc. Within this framework, Russia could play a self-ascribed role 
as guardian of international law, as was the case in the aftermath of Kosovo’s independence, yet 
the recognition of Abkhazia and Southern Ossetia has obviously undermined the viability of this 
track.  
Type 3 (a combination of decisionist and pluralist foundations of IS) presupposes that Russia 
might refuse to recognise the legitimacy of some elements of Western IS (such as NATO, for 
example, that, according to the logic of the Kremlin, has to be left in the past). This scenario 
may hypothetically envision the confrontation with the West, especially over NATO 
enlargement in areas adjacent to Russia. Since the accession of Ukraine and Georgia is not on 
the immediate agenda of NATO, the chances for this least desirable perspective do not seem to 
be high.  
Type 4 (the competition of different norms) suggests that Russia might prefer to recognise the 
legitimacy of Western IS yet in the meantime to isolate itself from – or even counter-balance – 
it. Russia might wish to invest in constructing alternative international societies (to be based, 
hypothetically, on the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Collective Security Treaty 
Organization, or even the amorphous Brazil-Russia-India-China ‘BRIC’ group). This is likely to 
be the model most clearly advocated by Russia in the near future, but its plausibility rests first of 
all upon China’s willingness to join in such a venture. The prospects for this do not look good 
beyond superficial political declarations, as China’s refusal to back Russia in the war with 
Georgia illustrated.  
What appears at the intersection of these perspectives is that Russia as an increasingly self-
assertive political subject is internally divided or, as critical thinkers would say, dislocated. 
These divisions are not by-products of different political platforms publicly competing with 
each other, but rather the result of internal dislocations inherent in and constitutive of Russia’s 
security identity. It is this lack of fixity and certainty that sometimes makes other countries 
perceive Russia as an aggressive country with erratic behaviour obsessed with its great power 
ambitions. Yet, as I have ventured to demonstrate, Russia’s attempts to rebuild the entire 
security architecture in the Euro-Atlantic world are structurally incomplete. The concluding 
argument of this paper, therefore, may be split into two interrelated parts. On the one hand, each 
country’s identity is “relationally defined”, i.e. is “more or less partial, never fully achieved”
49. 
This explains why so many contradictions are embedded in Russia’s security posture: “interests 
and identities are constantly modified and adapted as they are iterated in different institutional 
contexts”.
50 There are always external factors – more specifically, related to the construction of 
international society – that impede or distort the implementation of ‘grand designs’, including 
the Kremlin project of rebuilding the security architecture. On the other hand, the structural 
foundations of international society are also dislocated: neither of the four models of IS is self-
sufficient, and the boundaries of each are fuzzy. For example, the competition of norms (type 4) 
may be intersecting with the decisionist acts of power that would prioritise one norm over 
other(s) (type 3). Against this background one may presume that any attempts to offer a 
universalised concept of security will resemble wishful thinking which, nevertheless, performs 
the crucial function of constructing political subjectivities in a still anarchical and de-centred 
world. 
                                                      
49 Aletta Norval, op. cit., p. 6. 
50 David Howarth, “Populist Reason or Populist Peril? Evaluating Some Recent Theories”, paper 
presented at the workshop on New Stability, Democracy and Nationalism in Contemporary Russia, 
University of Basel, 26-27 September 2008, p. 5.  
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